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WHAT IS LOVE? 
DISCOURSE ABOUT EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES
SIMONE BELLI, ROM HARRÉ, LUPICINIO ÍÑIGUEZ
Abstract: The study of emotions has been one of the most important areas of research in the Social 
Sciences. Social Psychology has also contributed to the development of this area. In this article we analyse 
the contribution of social Psychology to the study of emotion, understood as a social construct, and its strong 
relationship with language. Specifically, we open a discussion on the basis of the general characteristics of 
the Social Psychology of emotions and the contributions from different disciplines in this area of research, 
to give meaning to the relationship they have with the language of emotions. In this regard, we have 
reviewed basic references for the study of the construction of an emotion, and thematically classified them 
into three broad categories: 1) Contributions from different backgrounds and perspectives; 2) Construction 
and de-construction studies of emotion, and 3) Postconstructionist studies of emotion. In the first category, 
we consider the main contributions from the Social Sciences, which can be summarized in two areas: 
philosophical-construction of an emotion; mainstream-psychology of emotion. In the second category we 
have began with the relationship between emotion and language and the social construction of emotion, 
i.e., its discursive status. We end with postconstructionist theories, i.e., Butler’s concept of performance and 
technoscience. To give more meaning to this line of research, the use of a concrete example of emotion 
seemed appropriate. Thus, we chose “love”.
Keywords: social construction of emotion; language; performance; technoscience; love. 
“The cry that we each utter in the first moment of our 
personal history as we are propelled from the womb 
into the world is an emotional signal. So emotion is the 
first language of us all.”
(Oatley 2007, 116)
What is sadness? What is anger? What is fear? Are they just words or is there something 
more? In principle, sadness, anger, and fear are emotions, and so is love. In general, it is 
usually considered that emotions are natural body-experiences that are then expressed 
through language and that language, in turn, is often described as irrational and subjective. 
That is, what we first feel in our bodies, later comes out of our mouths in the form of a 
discourse which is, in some way, opposed to reason. Emotions are also said to be gestated in 
the unconscious and not in the will. Thus, they are more spontaneous than artificial. They are 
more “sincere” than “thinking”. Sometimes they are mixed with rational behaviors, whose 
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existential status belongs to the order of the non-emotional. Recently, emotions have been 
considered not as the exclusive preservation of the individual’s interiority, but as discursive 
social constructions. Indeed, the social Psychology of emotions has shown that the processes, 
causes, and consequences of emotions depend on language use. Thus, we will deal with the 
close relationship between emotions and language. Especially, we will deal with an emotion 
that has been, in the history of mankind in the Western culture, really important (Oatley 
2004). We refer to “love”, understood in the broadest sense. Love has helped to define the 
essence of human beings. “There are some who never would have loved if they never had 
heard it spoken of”, said La Rochefoucauld. Without a history of love and lovers, we would 
know nothing on how to cope with such a fundamental emotion as well as on why this 
particular emotion has been investigated in its various aspects and the strength of the interest 
when it comes to the relationship between emotions and language.
For over one hundred years, emotions have been studied in several disciplines in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences. The topic of emotions has been studied in all branches of 
Social Sciences, thus there exists a large number of different theoretical approaches. For this 
reason, in the first part of this chapter we will address the most important contributions in 
three disciplines—Philosophy, Psychology, and Sociology—on the topic of emotions and its 
relationship with language.
In Psychology, for instance, Mayor (1988) argues that there is no commonly accepted 
definition of emotion, and that the history of emotions must be seen in the context of 
changes in Psychology as a discipline. In fact, one could say that what has most influenced 
the study of emotions has been the continuous change experienced by Psychology throughout 
its development as a discipline. And these will also influence the other two areas of study, 
Philosophy and Sociology. A review of emotions that does not take account of these 
disciplines, will give just a superficial view.
Subsequently, the language-emotion tandem has been the focus. Efforts have been made 
to develop arguments that serve to differentiate the relationship between these two terms; 
i.e., whether emotions can be “located” in language or accessed through language (Harré, 
Finlay-Jones, 1986; Bax 1986; Good, M., Good, B., Fischer 1988). Once we defined such a 
relationship, we have dealt in depth with the study of the social construction of emotions, as a 
natural evolution of the aforementioned binomial. The idea was to distinguish both historical 
and anthropological questions on how emotions are constructed (Harré 1984; Stearns 
and Stearns, 1985; Ibáñez 1994; Harré, Stearns 1995). Besides, our approach focuses on 
Discursive Psychology as proposed by Derek Edwards (1997, 2000; Edwards, Potter 1992). 
It must be said that Edwards is clearly influenced by the discursive approach developed by 
Harré (1984), Wooffitt (1992), Billig (1987), Heritage (1984), Potter and Wetherell (1987).
In recent years, research on emotions has been influenced by postconstructionist studies 
(Íñiguez 2005), particularly by those using performativity as a pivot concept. According to 
Judith Butler (1993), the construction of emotions is open to constant change and redefinition 
(Butler 1997; Braidotti 2000; Spivak 1990). The ultimate effect of the evolving movement of 
emotion and language is the notion of technoscience. Due to the use of new technologies of 
communication, new emotions, or different ways to draw on emotions, have emerged. The 
confluence of the common interests of philosophers, psychologists, and epistemologists is 
guided by the affective machine (Rose 1983; Brown 2005; Brown, Stenner 2001; Michael 
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2000, 2006), and by notions such as cyborg, techno-disembodiment (Haraway 1989, 1995; 
James, Carkeek 1997; Gibbs 2006; Hollinger 2000; Ramos 2005), and “disclosure”, i.e., a 
diffuse phenomenon referring to the meaning of expressing emotions through a screen.
Given the multiplicity of perspectives, and the open and plural theoretical and 
methodological controversies, as already mentioned, we will offer an overview of the 
scientific study of emotions as a continuous line of different Social Sciences contributions. 
We consider interesting to draw the line of continuity of this area of knowledge, using an 
example whose explanatory strength and whose impact on several researches have made us 
understand the importance of the relationship between emotion and language. Expressing 
love, i.e., being in love, has been through the history of literature a sort of statement, which 
has developed a whole series of myths and experiences over the centuries. For this reason, we 
will explore the aforementioned areas of knowledge regarding the different expressions of 
“love”. 
Background 
The Philosophical Character
William Lyons (1985) provides a good starting point to introduce the topic of the 
Philosophy of emotion, specifically that of love. Using “love” as an example, we can connect 
Philosophy to Psychology, and at the same time emotion to language, which is the central 
theme of this chapter.
The point of looking closely at ordinary usage, if one is a psychologist, is that it often provides 
a clue to distinctions which it is theoretically important to take account of. We know so much 
about human beings, and our knowledge is incorporated implicitly in our language. Making it 
explicit could be a more fruitful preliminary to developing a theory than gaping at rats or grey 
geese (Peters 1958).
Based on this quote from Peters, Lyons (1985, 4) defines emotion as a functional model 
expressed in words. Thus, emotions are feelings directed outward and toward whatever 
causes them to come out. In this case, Lyons (1985, 55) assumes the concept of emotions as 
formulated by Spinoza, who asserted that we often have false beliefs about the causes of our 
feelings, what lead us to hate those we should love and vice versa.
Love illustrates this quite clearly. According to Lyons (1985, 186), we use feelings 
as indicators of the presence or absence of love. We say things like “don’t you love me 
anymore?” when the other person has not shown certain feelings in settings where he or 
she was expected to do so. Similarly, when someone tell us “I don’t feel the same for you”, 
we can infer that it means “I don’t love you anymore”. It is not easy to declare your love for 
someone, especially if one hopes to be taken seriously and, at the same time, one tries to 
keep distance from the evaluative aspects of love held by the beloved one.
The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) is right in this direction by developing the 
discursive burden of emotions. He argues that emotions are not purely mental experiences, 
but also processes of identities, which identify the individual. Wittgenstein distinguishes, as 
Aristotle did, between the matter and the content of emotions. He states that emotions and 
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psychological reactions are not two different events, but they can be described in two ways. 
This inseparableness of matter and form represents what is called “organizational change”, 
i.e., the connection between emotion and object, between emotions and psychological 
and behavioral changes, which is logical and necessary, since a synthesis of both yields a 
common definition of emotion.
According to Wittgenstein (1958), we do not know our own emotions and feelings 
in a natural way or by observation. We produce spontaneous linguistic articulations of 
our feelings and impressions of the world. We express descriptive states of our affects. 
Wittgenstein discovered a new species of speech acts. He asserts that phrases are made up 
processes, away from the consecration of words and emotions in performance. In the same 
vein, there are new methods of the post-empirical Psychology paradigm that has been well 
discussed in Harré’s (1989) work.
A topic of common interest for Philosophy of language and Discursive Psychology is the 
important role of language in the construction of emotions. According to Foucault (1966), 
discourse is a junction between objects and theory, and it not only produces statements, 
but also the power of the object in question and the materialism as redefined to include the 
immateriality of the body-subject. Foucault’s discourse analysis permits to extract emotions 
from discourse to understand how the intangible effects are taken seriously in the discourse 
and, at the same time, given the changing conditions of speech, the contributions of such 
effects. This is an immaterial change inside discourse. It is an emotional change, a dynamic 
perspective, a vector of disturbance, and it is not considered appropriate to maintain 
regulatory practices and structures which have hogged the attention in ethnographic 
research.
In this section, we have highlighted the importance of the role of emotions in language 
from a philosophical perspective. As we already said, in this chapter, Philosophy is 
something constructed through language, and it does not exist outside discourse.
From Philosophy to Psychology 
There is a blurred line between Philosophy and Psychology, especially when it comes to 
frame an area of knowledge such as emotions and language. For this reason, we do not want 
to set as a goal a demarcation between the two disciplines. We opt for a continuous interplay 
between them, which allows us to see an interesting set of contributions to our review.
The topic of emotions in Psychology has been studied in all its branches. There are 
many theoretical approaches holding different views. Mayor (1988) argues that there 
is no commonly accepted definition of emotion, and, for this reason, its history in 
Psychology should be seen in a context of continuous changes inside the discipline itself. 
This clarification is necessary and essential before attempting to get into the field of the 
Psychology of emotions. The important thing here is to have very clear that changes in the 
overall context of the history of Psychology have most influenced the topic of emotions. 
Based on this consideration, it is possible to apply psychological theories in a more general 
way and to try to define the specific context of the Psychology of emotions.
Likewise, many authors working in this area prefer a mainstream approach. Some of 
them approach the behaviorist tradition, which focuses on interactions via observation. 
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Specifically, they follow the methodological standards of quantitative and positivist 
approaches. These authors assert that the best way to establish causal relationships is to 
consider that behavior is actualised in a social context. In current research, this question 
is picked up by another important figure in the field of study of emotions, Keith Oatley. 
According to Oatley, emotion is a core competence in communication, always dependent on 
others’ intentions and actions. But this will be further developed in later sections.
In this regard, Mayor (1988) considers that the two aspects of emotion, mind and body, 
may be studied in an integrated way from different perspectives. Mandler (1988) argues 
that Psychology of emotions should address the conditions that give rise to cognitive 
and physiological events. It should offer an integrative perspective of the cognitivist and 
behaviorist approaches as parts of one Psychology of emotions. It should gather contributions 
that have been studied separately. 
Another major trend in research on expressions of emotion is the one limited to the 
linguistic realm. It was developed by Russell (2003) and Wierzbicka (2008). Margaret 
Wetherell (1995) is the author of an important work on discourse in romantic relationships. 
She analyses the discourse on love and romance, the subject of love, and how certain feelings 
are expressed in relationships. Jackson (1994) researches on how to construct and, above 
all, how to handle the romantic narrative and basic instincts. Thus, he defines sex based on 
emotional discourses.
The work of Robert Sternberg is unavoidable in a discussion of the Psychology of 
love. He carried out his first research about love in the early 1980s, focusing initially on its 
structure: a psychometric type of theory of love (Sternberg, Grajek 1984). The problem was 
that the large number of disparate emotions, thoughts, and motivations, seemed to describe 
elements of love without systematizing them and without suggesting why anyone would love 
some people but not other. For this reason, the next step of his research was to formulate a 
new triangular theory of love, according to which, love could be understood as comprising 
three components: intimacy, passion, and commitment (Sternberg 1986). But in our opinion, 
the most important contribution of Sternberg to the Psychology of love begins in the 1990s. 
He began to formulate the view of love as a story. The basic idea is that we tend to fall in love 
with people whose stories are complementary to ours (Sternberg 1995, 1998). 
Also, the work of John Alan Lee is generally considered to be a landmark in the field, 
and deserves a mention for his constructed ideal types differentiating between six several 
conceptions of intimate adult affiliation. A new interviewing method was devised to enable 
individuals “in love” to reconstruct their experience in codeable form: Eros, Storge, Ludus, 
Manía, Pragma y Ágape (Lee 1977, 1988).
We have realized how the interest for research on emotions in Psychology has grown, and 
how through the years such an interest has changed trends as well as the way emotion as a 
process is psychologically understood. Tracing this path has proved useful for bringing the 
reader into a more comfortable position to understand the authors’ argumentation threads. 
This is the importance of language in the study of emotions.
As we saw in this section, the Psychology of emotions is a discipline that has given 
ample space to the study of emotion in the last two centuries. It is important to understand 
these different perspectives in the scientific context in which they have been produced. 
Nevertheless, each of them has contributed to and influenced considerably the topic of 
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emotion viewed as a social and discursive construction in different ways. Thanks to the 
aforementioned scientific field, we find more comprehensible to understand how the study of 
emotion has had a distinct and complementary “history” in over a hundred years. This allows 
us to continue our review of the literature on the construction of emotion, and to provide 
some common coordinates for the understanding of the following sections. 
Construction and Deconstruction of an Emotion 
As we saw in the first part of this chapter, emotions have a strong relationship with 
language (Kenny 1963; Harré 1986a, 1989; Armon-Jones 1986). This particular relationship 
is something that can be socially constructed (Berger and Luckman 1966; Harré 1986a). 
Understanding emotions as social constructions is possible only through language (Bax 1986; 
Besnier 1990; Chance and Fiese 1999; Danes 1994). In this second part, we will see how this 
is possible, and how it influences our approach to the discipline.
Emotion and Language 
“Le langage est [...] peut-etre un obstacle à la solitude 
de l’homme” (Hagège 1986, 8).
“The language (of life, not that of mathematicians), this 
other living language that is art, love and friendship, 
they are all attempts at reunite performed by the self 
from his island for transcending his solitude” 
(Sábato 1967, 144).
Before beginning to show what the construction of an emotion consists in, we think 
it is appropriate to stop and think what speaking of emotion and language means. Oatley 
(2007, 27) argues that in 500 years of history of writing, emotions have been the source of 
most interesting arguments. Above all, there is an emotion that is the most commonly used 
in these 500 years of history of writing: love. Let us think for a moment of an emotional 
Spanish expression: “Te quiero”. This phrase is used to express love for another person, the 
most famous examples being those of romantic novels. In their novels, authors try to put 
emotions in words; some authors succeed, others do not. Nevertheless, this process might be 
seen inversely. Some authors attempt to construct emotions through the use of words. They 
treat love without emotion as if it were an individual’s truth. They construct a context, and 
give meaning to certain words, so we can talk about love. As we shall see later, they try to 
construct love as an emotional performance.
The great writers are continually fighting to put this emotion into their pages the way we 
described above. Especially, they do their best to represent the different aspects of love. It is 
the great task of the writer, as Bjorn Larsson, linguist and novelist, said. It is impossible to 
relive a great love, neither to interpret the nonverbal signs of love. All one can say is “I love 
you”, which is a sign of no return.
In this part, we only treat one aspect of performance. We will show more details later. We 
try to relive the great passion of love, but paradoxically it seems that we cannot. Nevertheless, 
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the use of certain words and the construction of certain contexts, allow us to recreate this 
performance. We can narrate this great passion, though we cannot relive it. Although it is 
not possible to relive it, it is possible to reconstruct this particular mood by using words. We 
can construct purely emotional situations, only through the use of language, thanks to such a 
performance.
When it comes to this “wordy” love issue, another fascinating topic is the interpretation 
of the great romances, i.e., the interpretation of signs, looks, gestures, which are very tenuous 
in performance. But, as we saw in previous paragraphs, especially in Ekman’s studies, 
those signs are part of the body language and express emotions. Performance also requires 
them. Gestures, signs, and glances are weak, as they exist at the very moment of their own 
expression and then they disappear. And if they attempt to repeat themselves in order to 
achieve the same effect they are doomed to fail. Repetition is useless. It means nothing but 
a repetition of the phrase “I love you”, a knowing look between unknown persons. Saying “I 
love you” is understood as an emotional performance, even if well done, i.e., saying it while 
caressing the neck and the ear of the beloved one. The expression of an emotion is not just a 
statement, but a complete performance, according to Judith Butler (1993). “I love you” is an 
expression of the whole body, not just a simple sentence.
The way and form of performance, like being shy for instance, influence the actual 
performance itself. “I love you” said by a shy person is not the same “I love you” said by a 
self-confident person. The words are the same, but the two performances are really distinct 
from each other, since persons do not express their emotion by just uttering it, but by uttering 
it in a certain way (Green 1970). Words are designed to produce real emotions, which might 
exist in the inter-subjective space.
Also, the time of reciprocity is important, the precarious moment when an individual 
decides to set the magic formula: “Te quiero”. Here intervenes the psycho-magical element 
of emotions (Taylor 1972). The psycho-magic of saying “I love you” is a performance of no 
return (Larsson 1997). For better or for worst, after this performance the lives of any given 
persons can hardly return to the state prior to the pronunciation of this “formula”.
Study of Social Construction of Emotion 
After having defined what we mean by emotions and language, we are now at the core 
of this chapter, i.e., the study of the social construction of emotion. We are particularly 
interested in history and discourse. We will show several examples which will help us to 
understand the aforementioned concept of performance.
There are several authors who research on social construction of emotion from a historical 
point of view. The most notable are Harré (1984), Stearns and Stearns (1985), Gergen (1990), 
Clark (1988), Dickinson and O’Shaughnessy (1997), Kemper (1981) and Wouters (1989). 
The historical approach is based on studies of the evolution of “accidie” (Wenzel 1960), for 
example. It focuses on how this particular feeling has changed over time. We will offer more 
details on this by the end of the chapter. In discussing the discursive construction of love and 
its historical conditioning by the discourses of romantic literature, a good deal of the territory 
has already been covered for Niklas Luhmann and his historical studies on the “semantics of 
love” (Luhmann 1998).
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The second macro-level of studies on the social construction of emotion is that of the 
discourse. A first approach has focused on clarifying what a metaphor of an emotion is, 
and how it should be taken as a discursive action (Lakoff 1980). In this vein, we find some 
innovative and creative works (Russell 2003; Wierzbicka 2008; Gibbs 2006; Greenwood 
1992; Harré and Stearns 1995; Hollander and Gordon 2006; Kövecses and Palmer 1999). 
These authors start from a common point: the design of emotion as a discursive construction.
Once one sees the task of understanding human behavior as involving interpretation and 
empathy rather than prediction or control, the self-reports of the people one is studying 
become very important in any psychological research project. And these should not be taken as 
(falsifiable) reports of states of mind but as expressions of how things are to the subject. Thus 
the experiment or observation has to enter into a discourse with the being studied and try to 
appreciate the shape of the subject’s cognitive world. But at this point it no longer makes sense 
to talk of observer and subjects at all. There are only coparticipants in the project of making 
sense of the world and our experience of it (Harré and Gillet 1994, 21).
Since emotions are socially produced, they have a close relationship with language and 
communication (Searle 1992, 248). It has to do with the discovery of the social character of 
mind, which links semantics and linguistic pragmatics to our field of action, as discursive 
social Psychology states (Larsson 1997, 20). The social construction of emotion allows us to 
speak of emotions as something that can be communicated. Searle helps us to understand this 
in his text “The Social Construction of Reality” (1995).
Discursive Psychology of Emotion 
“(...) Mettre quelque chose en commun” 
(Larsson 1997, 32)
We have shown how social constructionism helps us to understand how emotions are 
constructed through language. Now we will focus on the psychological aspects of such a 
process. As Larsson asserts, emotions put things together. Emotions allow us to put things in 
common. For Discursive Psychology, the role of verbal interaction is crucial (Larsson 1997, 
147) in the constitution and emergence of the psychic man.
The human sciences must come to terms not only with a description of the events that affect 
a person but also with the interpretation of those events by that very person. This entails that, 
for many purposes, the investigator must enter into dialogue with the subject and, of course, 
that dialogue will not itself be psychologically neutral in relation to the subject’s thought and 
action. Furthermore, they enter into dialogue as “investigator” and “subject”, but this is only 
one of the many pairs role they, as individual people, might adopt. And the perception of other 
aspects of their relationship may, of course, have an influence on any behavior that occurs in an 
experimental situation (Harré and Gillett 1994, 135).
However, as a result of this interest in the social construction of emotions, Psychology 
has contributed, in recent decades, to situate emotions in a new space called “discursive 
psychology of emotion” (Edwards 1997, 1999). Such a space corresponds to the junction 
of the different lines we have distinguished above. In Discursive Psychology of emotion the 
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most important issue is the use of emotions in language, specifically the actions and effects 
of emotional speech in relational frameworks (Buttny 1993).
Discursive Psychology of emotion is based on studies, such as Oatley and Jenkins’ (1992) 
explanation of emotion based on cognition, Coulter’s (1990) sketch of the emotional sense 
and disposition, and finally Garfinkel’s (1984) categorization of emotions according to the 
criteria of rationality.
In order to understand Discursive Psychology, it is necessary to return to some authors 
with a social constructionist background as, for instance, the contributions of Harré (1986a). 
Despite their agreement, Discursive Psychology and social constructionism have some 
differences. While Discursive Psychology has focused on the role of discourse, social 
constructionism has put its emphasis on social relations and their context (Cortina 2004). 
Lakoff (1980) and Wierzbicka (2008) have made significant contributions to Discursive 
Psychology. They proposed a cognitive-semantic model. Gergen (1994) finds a significant 
relationship between these two major perspectives, and proposes the cognitive-semantic and 
social constructionist model.
The main topics discussed in Discursive Psychology of emotion are perceptions, feelings, 
and emotions (Edwards 1997; Íñiguez 2003; Edwards and Potter 1992; Edwards 2000, 2001). 
Edwards (2001) gives some background for the Discursive Psychology of emotion: Pollner’s 
(1987) disconnection from reality, Wieder’s (1974) studies on the rules of drug dealers, 
Atkinson and Heritage’s (1984) research on the exclamation “Oh!” when receiving new 
information, Lynch and Bogen’s (1996) studies on memory and forgetfulness, and Buttny’s 
(1993) studies on social responsibility in communication.
According to Edwards (2001, 145) “the Psychology of emotions is the study of how they 
are used and are important in emotional terms everyday speech.” This definition is widely 
argued (Edwards 1997, 2000) and shared (Harré 1999). Edwards (2000, 2001) explores 
the emotional discursive investment in an extreme form, and considers that reactions are 
constructed as emotional reactions. The emotional reactions issue is discussed in more detail 
by Bamberg (2005). On Edwards’ works it is important to highlight the importance of script 
formulations. The use of discourse analysis, specially its 10 points (Edwards and Potter 
1992), is the main feature of Discursive Psychology of emotion.
For an essential bibliography on Discursive Psychology of emotion, we can highlight the 
following authors: Edwards (1997), Potter (2003), Billig (2001), Coulter (1990), Lynch and 
Bogen (1996), and Wieder (1974). What has been seen here is a representative sample of 
authors and their most important works inside Discursive Psychology of emotion. The next 
section introduces the post-constructionist approach to the study of emotion. 
Post-constructionism of Emotion
After defining emotion, language, and how social constructionism and Discursive 
Psychology deal with them, we will focus now on post-constructionist studies, which have 
been quite successful in Social Sciences recently.
Post-constructionist theorists reject the constructionist explanation of the underlying 
structures of social phenomena. They are defined primarily following Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the sign.
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One aspect that we found very innovative in this area is the issue of performance. It helps 
us to understand emotion as a changing process, which is never repeated, as love itself in 
romances or in real life.
Performance and Emotion 
“Al que toca o recita le resulta indispensable la 
presencia de otros: la lábil performance existe sólo si 
es vista o escuchada, por lo tanto, sólo en presencia de 
un «público»” (Virno 2004, 42).
When it comes to the issue of performance in post-constructionist studies, the name of 
Judith Butler is certainly the most important. Butler (1993, 1997) deals with emotions as 
a constant evolution in discourse. She looks at emotions in a completely new perspective 
through the concept of performance. Although in her text the term “emotion” is not explicit, 
it arises spontaneously in all of her discourses and positions.
Using the concept of performance, Butler (1993) explores how discourse creates a 
need for particular emotions: “Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally constructed, 
are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that are intended to express 
manufacturing constituted and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive 
means” (Butler 1993, 136). In this way, emotion is a performance produced by these 
fabrications, which are internally discontinuous acts. That is to say, emotions do not 
exist prior to their performance, and success of the copy, or “repetition” of an emotion 
previously performed, can never be invoked to faithfully reproduce that event, i.e., a new 
emotion.
These events or “fabrications” are seen as natural by repeating over time a set of 
multiple everyday life interactions. These performative acts are open to constant change and 
redefinitions. Acts or “fabrications” (Butler 1993) eventually become standards that can be 
seen as natural.
The notion of performance in Butler’s work is indebted to John Austin (1955). When she 
mentions the concept of performativity in language, certainly we must mention John Austin’s 
work, especially one of his most famous works “How to do things with words” (1955), which 
by the way is relevant to our research. Austin distinguished three types of acts that can be 
done with words, called locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. Saying something is a 
locutionary act, but at the same time it is an illocutionary act and sometimes a perlocutionary 
one. Butler is interested in perlocutionary acts that establish that saying is doing. Saying 
something generates effects and consequences on feelings, on thoughts and actions, on 
self and on others. Austin referred to feelings and emotions contained in conventional 
performative acts, and illocutionary aspects produced in a performative way. The notion of 
performance used by Judith Butler, continues to be a locutionary act. The implicit point in 
Austin’s work is that performance depends on “happy” utterances, i.e., when its structure is 
part of its circumstances. Butler takes this notion and widens it, giving it the strength and 
power that these actions have on the speaker and on others and, above all, their capacity to 
produce intended changes and transformations.
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Butler is interested in perlocutionary acts, i.e., when saying something produces effects 
and consequences on feelings, thoughts or actions of self and others.
Another important concept for Butler (1993) is iteration. She uses Derrida’s theory of 
iteration because of how it deepens the understanding of performance: “Performativity 
cannot be understood outside of an iterative process, a regulated and limited repetition of 
norms. (...) This means that the iterative performance is not an act or event, singular, but 
a ritualized production (...)” (Butler 1993, 95). In short, it is “a stylized repetition of acts” 
(Butler 1993, 140).
The concept of performativity in Butler is therefore an attempt to find a way to rethink 
the relationship between social structures and individual agencies. In Butler’s interpretation, 
performativity is understood as that which promotes and supports the implementation 
process through an iterative repetition subject to certain rules. Such standards should be 
understood, as argued earlier, in the design of joint Wittgensteinian spontaneous linguistic 
sensations. Equally, we should understand that utterances are purely spontaneous processes 
(Wittgenstein 1958). Since rules are valid only in some context, and for some people only, 
they cannot be duplicated for different situations. The politics of performativity requires the 
iterative power of discourse to produce the phenomenon of emotion, since emotion does not 
exist before one says something, i.e., before producing a speech act.
In our research we explored how these “fabrications” “do” emotions. Thus, emotions are 
designed as socially constructed phenomena. They are socially constructed identities that 
indicate how the audience must behave (Butler 1993). As explained above, these emotions 
do not pre-exist to their performance, and cannot be reused and categorized and quoted in the 
future (Gregson and Rose 2000, 438).
Butler argues that gender is created through performance and suggests that gender is not 
a fixed identity or a given series of different acts. Rather it is an identity constructed through 
time and space through an iteration of stylized acts (Butler 1993).
Performative acts are constructed by iteration, by persistence and stability and by the 
possibility of rupture, of change, of deconstruction too. However, performance is not just 
an actuation, a staging. According to Butler, iteration introduces at once the temporality of 
a subject. It is not a singular act or event, but a ritualized production, an iteration of a ban 
under certain conditions, a taboo. The subject is never completely determined (Femenía 
2003). Right there, as Femenía (2003) asserts, the political capacity anchors itself and 
processes of statements can reinstate new meanings. Strictly speaking, the strength of the 
drift of its performance breaks with the past contexts and the ability to take new ones is 
unlimited.
Indeed, getting distance from Austin and Derrida, Butler argues that what constitutes the 
real strength of performance is not consistent with the formulation of any of them. However, 
both views, taken together, led to the proposal of a theory of social iterative speech acts. 
Speech is not like writing, says Butler, because the body is present in speech in a different 
way than in writing, but also because the relationship between body and speech, though 
oblique, actualizes in the same expression. Although writing and speaking are both acts of 
the body, the mark of the body that reads a text not always makes clear who owns the body. 
The speech act actualizes in the body. The simultaneity of the production and externalization 
of expression not only report what is said but shows the body as the instrument for rhetoric 
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expression. According to Felman, who Butler quotes, the excess of discourse should be 
read with and against the prepositional content of what is said. Then, the relation between 
speech act and body act puts into its rightful place the body, its gestures, its aesthetic, and 
its unconscious knowledge as the site of the reconstruction of practical sense, without which 
social reality cannot be constituted as such. Finally, in order to externalize an emotion a 
sentence is not enough. According to Judith Butler, a complete performance is needed. 
“I love you” is an expression of the body as a totality, not just a simple phrase.
The concept of performance, for example, applied in the stories of schizophrenic 
patients (Leudar 2007), allows us to understand the iteration. Leudar analyses the “voices” 
schizophrenic patients hear, and how changes in the stories, continually appearing, 
disappearing and changing shape and intensity, are never the same. These “voices” can 
be understood as emotions that are never at the same level of violence and presence for 
patients with schizophrenia. Also, they are useful to understand the process of iteration that 
constitutes the performance.
It is important to understand that “performativity is not a single act, but a repetition 
and a ritual which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of the body” 
(Butler 1993, 15). The body is not a “fact” (Butler 1993), but a variable boundary, politically 
regulated. It is a significant practice. This allows us to speak of emotions in technoscience, 
in terms of techno-disembodiment and machine, which has much to do with “corporality”, as 
discussed below.
Moreover, Butler proposes a crucial distinction between expression and performance. 
Acts, in their various ways, produced or presented by the body, are performative, have their 
cultural significance, and do not have a pre-existing identity that can be measured. Acts 
cannot be true or false, real or apparent.
So acts, gestures, and codes in general are performative in the sense that the essences 
and identities expressed are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs 
and other discursive means (Butler 1993, 136). It does not mean that for Butler the body is 
reducible to language but that language emerges from the body (Butler 2004, 198). Thus, we 
can say that the concept of performativity is not prepared “only for acts of discourse, but also 
for physical acts” (Butler 2003, 198). The relationship between the two is quite complicated. 
In order to tackle such a difficulty Butler introduces the term “chiasmus” (Butler 1993). 
It states that “there is always a physical dimension of life that cannot be fully represented” 
(Butler 2003, 199).
Butler adds that speech is inseparable from the body due to the illocutionary force 
underlying each issue. Speech is made of bodily acts. If any speech act is performed, it 
communicates not only a literary message but a bodily one, since the body is a privileged 
rhetorical instrument of expression. An act is a performative and discursive practice, in 
the sense that it is a linguistic act constantly subject to interpretation. The performative act 
must be performed as a play, presented to an audience and interpreted in accordance with 
predetermined rules. In turn, the performative act produces an effect, i.e., constructs reality 
as a result of the performed act (Butler 1997a).
Performance has not only been used for studies of gender. There is a vast narrative on 
the concept of performance in Social Sciences. Thus, in recent years some geographers 
have used performance to explain, for example, the social construction of identity in human 
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geographic areas (Gregson and Rose 2000, 434). In the construction of identity, performance 
plays a central role. It is made of looks, personalities, and emotions, and it is manipulated by 
identities. “Kind” or “friendly” are concepts that have been modified and handled by different 
people (Guyatt 2005). Victoria Guyatt (2005) proposed a gender study on workers at a pub in 
New Zealand, and distinguished among their emotions. Girls were moving in a completely 
positive emotional context, were categorized as funny, pretty, and extroverted. On the other 
hand, boys had to appear as “violent, aggressive, strong, and kicking ass.” These two different 
constructions of gender identity have to be seen as a steady and progressive performance of 
workers at a pub. These fabrications are what Butler (1993) calls an emotional gender identity. 
These acts are simply a natural iteration of a performance over time. They are, in many ways, 
the interactions of everyday life (Butler 1993). Performance is regulated, but it is unstable, 
and it is altered by subjective views that may be adopted throughout the performance itself.
Averill (1982) asserts that emotions are social roles. He emphasizes the performative 
role of emotions and takes into account the emotional discourse implying emotions in 
themselves. For example, one can consider love as an emotion, a subsequent performance. 
“Falling in love” is nothing but a fabrication of the world like any other. James Averill (1982) 
suggests that emotions are improvised. They are based on the individual’s interpretation of 
the situation. These improvisations and interpretations occur in social contexts in everyday 
experiences.
The Performance of Emotions Over Time 
In this last part of the chapter, and after having defined the various steps for 
understanding how emotions have a strong relationship with language, especially following 
the concept of performance, we will now focus on the meaning of all this, and what are 
the “effects” in everyday discourse. As we saw earlier, in social constructionism there 
are two perspectives, the historical and the discursive. In the historical, emotions change 
over time, and such a change is due to discourse. Both views have are part of a discipline 
called Discursive Psychology. This change, this evolution, of emotions (including their 
disappearance) can be understood only through post-constructionist studies. Performance 
helps us to understand why some emotions appear and others disappear in ordinary language. 
Since emotions are narratives, they are action stories (Oatley and Jenkins 1992, 75).
Emotions are a bodily experience that cannot be separated from the socio-cultural 
contexts in which we find ourselves. This is why we consider important to see how 
emotions change over the years. It is a way to understand emotions in a historical-discursive 
framework, and to see the changes into time. This vision can also be understood as a 
performance in everyday discourse. There are emotional terms which our generation no 
longer uses, but other terms are used which have replaced earlier ones in the discursive arena. 
Thus, emotions become obsolete, outdated, completely “out”. Emotions evolve or disappear 
over time, and always led by the concept of performance in our daily stories. Each language 
offers us examples of emotions that have disappeared, that are not in our discourse anymore. 
For example, the term “accidie” is extinct in the discursive arena.
In use from the thirteenth century until the sixteenth century, today the term accidie 
is synonym of laziness, disinterest, but is not equivalent to any of them. Accidie refers to 
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feelings associated with loss of intrinsic motivation towards our own religious duties (Robert, 
2003: 245). In literature one can find the term “accidie” in “Don Quixote”, by Cervantes. 
The term accidie has been rescued in recent years by Giorgio Agamben (1995) to describe 
the state that lies between mourning and melancholy: “Throughout the Middle Ages, a 
scourge worse than the plague that infects castles, the villas, and palaces of the city’s world 
tilts on the houses of the spiritual life, enters the cells and in the cloisters of monasteries in 
the tebaidas of hermits in the rags of the prisoners. Acedia, tristitia, taedium vitae, desidia 
are the names that the Fathers of the Church gives to induce death in the soul.” Accidie also 
belongs to the seven deadly sins, and it was often related to God (Edwards 1997). But in 
our days it is completely missing as an emotion, and it is very difficult to find it in everyday 
discourse. Now there are other synonyms like laziness, but it is not the same. Thus, the term 
“accidie” disappeared in contemporary usage.
Another example is the term “melancholy”. Our ancestors made frequent use of this word 
many times to express a certain emotion, but our generations do not (Robert 2003, 160). It 
is very easy to remember our grandparents pronouncing this term in their stories, but we 
no longer use it. It seems that melancholy has gone out of fashion. It does not appear in our 
everyday discourse. Neither does it appear in songs even though in a not too distant past a 
frequent use of this term was made. Melancholy is now replaced in everyday language with 
words such as sadness, depression, and loneliness.
These two examples were used to support the theory that emotions have to be interpreted 
in the social context in which they occur. Thus, it is no wonder that emotions come and go 
in the discursive arena. It is a steady performance that makes new feelings appear in the 
discursive arena.
Robert (2003, 160) argues that emotions create actions, especially those concerning the 
words that generate them. In this sense, emotions, or words referring to emotions, are not the 
same in a classroom at the University of Chicago or in a monastery in the medieval Spain 
(ibid.,183). They change over time and space, i.e., they change depending on the context in 
which they are generated.
Emotions change in natural and spontaneous language of everyday life. New words enter 
the discursive arena, thanks to a performance that has never been tried before, and then new 
areas are produced. For instance, emotions begin to enter the technological language as 
another performance in everyday discourse. Love stories in front of a flat screen are typical 
of everyday life.
The concept of performance related to ICT represents a new narrative in Social Sciences, 
coining concepts like techno-disembodiment and affective machine. Only in recent years 
have emotions and new technologies been understood to have a very close relationship, 
especially on the subject of intimacy. This is evident from the interviews with users of 
cyber-cafes made by the GESCIT project—an immigrant mother, who cries while speaking 
on the phone with her children and family at home; a young immigrant who “parties” with 
some friends from his motherland through the Internet; or two young lovers, separated by a 
thousand miles, who have a chat conversation.
Since emotions are bodily experiences that cannot be separated from the socio-cultural 
contexts in which we find ourselves, we consider important to emphasize that emotions have 
changed over the years. Emotions have to be understood in a historical perspective in order 
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to see their changes in time. This vision can also be understood as a performance in daily 
discourse. There are emotional terms our generation no longer uses, but we use other terms 
that have replaced earlier ones in the discursive arena. Why do emotions become obsolete, 
outdated, completely out? Emotions evolve or disappear over time, and so does performance 
in our daily stories. Each language offers us examples of emotions that have disappeared, that 
no longer exist in our discourse. 
The Last Emotional Frontier: Techno-science 
We understand emotions in this chapter as a textual practice, as a semantic evolution. 
Thus, some of the aims of a researcher in this field would be to find in emotional discourse 
forms of contemporary life. He or she can take a historical perspective showing how the 
discourse of emotions is related to a socio-linguistic field. We understand that performance 
is subject to the power of the discourse of emotions. Emotional discourse contains new 
concepts and metaphors to articulate and understand emotions in the lexicon. Concepts such 
as techno-disembodiment or human-affective machine are parts of the techno-scientific 
side of emotions, and are examples of a new performance, new emotions that appear in the 
discursive arena.
The examples we have shown in the preceding paragraph are used to support the theory 
that emotions have to be interpreted in the social context in which they occur, so there is 
no wonder if emotions come and go in discursive arena. Mike Michael (1996, 2000, 2004, 
2006), with a clear semiotic method, recognizes emotions as affective matter.
Techno-science is also related to the semantic concept of embodiment, but it considers 
its cognitive treatment, and emphasizes the communicative and linguistic turn. The main 
authors working in this direction are Haworth (1990), Niedenthal, Barsalou, Ric, and Krauth-
Gruber (2005), Prinz (2005), Lyon (1999), Katz (1996), Harré in his text “The Necessity of 
Personhood as Embodied Being” (1995), Malin and Peterson (2001) and Haworth (1990).
The embodiment concept also has a more extreme sense, the case of techno-
disembodiment., a concept studied by James and Carkeek (1997a, 1997b).
These different discourses on affections and emotions in technoscience can be seen in the 
context offered by Nicholas Rose (1983) who introduces the concept of emotional material 
and the figure of the machine that constructs the individual, i.e., the affective machine. 
This vision is also embodied by the figure of Haraway’s (1990, 1995) cyborg and Hollinger 
(2000). Also Gergen (1990) gives a reinterpretation of emotional material in the postmodern 
society.
Steve Brown and Paul Stenner (2001; Brown 2005) speak of collective emotions in 
technoscience and of consumer society, by using the writings of Spinoza as well as those 
of more recent authors like Schaub (1933), and specifically the notion of affective material 
becoming a human-machine.
When you deal with emotions and language in technoscience, especially if you focus on 
love, there is a very important aspect, disclosure (Aviram, Amichai-Hamburger 2005; Qian, 
Scott 2007), which is one of the key issues we have found throughout our analysis and in 
our research group. Disclosure refers to what fascinates us when talking to a stranger or to 
someone we already know, when we are facing a computer screen. Such a fascination allows 
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us to say things we would never say in person, especially if we talk in terms of affectivity. 
This is why using these technologies in different aspects of life is so successful. Phenomena 
such as Facebook, ensures contact with someone who one already knows, but going into 
a more intimate mode in which we can express our hidden emotions. And this is achieved 
through the language, through the performance, which allows us to rethink relationships, and 
intimate with new technologies. Now we are aware of emotions when we are in front of a flat 
screen. Disclosure is the main emotion that technology causes us. If we think about these 
emotional-affective processes, we understand the fundamental importance of these aspects in 
relationships.
Technology measures, quantifies, and identifies emotional states and the communication 
of these emotions between people and consequently between machines in real time. 
The concept of techno-disembodiment as defined by Paul James and Freya Carkeek is 
“an increasing abstraction of the way we live our bodies and widespread technological 
mediation of social relations” (Carkeek and James 1997, 107). Carkeek and James argue 
that the strength of this concept is related to an emotional charge attached to the residual 
erotic-romantic, such as techno-sexuality. Sex without the presence of another person or the 
representation of a technological sexual organ, the wide range of telephone-sex practices 
and sex chat-up, as well as cosmetic surgery, are examples that illustrate an emerging 
development and widespread feature of postmodern times. These practices are part of the 
broader phenomenon of techno-disembodiment.
According to Healey and Gould (2001) the affective machine constructs technological 
systems that can interact with humans and transmit bio-psychological changes, for instance, 
using shoes, bracelets, t-shirts, etc. These objects receive and transmit changes to the 
individual, specifically emotional states attached to social contexts. These gadgets are only 
a phase in man-machine interaction, i.e., the affective human-machine (Healey and Gould 
2001).
Consumption of technologies may be taken as a possible emotion. The simple term 
“iPod” expresses an emotion in our daily stories. Emotions regarded as consumer products 
are one aspect that has been successfully developed in research during the last decade 
(Belli, Íñiguez 2008). As mentioned above, emotions not only become obsolete, but new 
formulations occur within the discursive arena. 
Discussion
As we already said (Belli, Íñiguez 2008), emotions have a strong relationship with 
language. We can express emotions through language. Thus, we believe it is essential to 
show how different disciplines have made important contributions to this theory, especially 
in Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, and Linguistics.
All these fields have looked at the social construction of emotions. It is important to 
understand that it is impossible to speak of the social construction of emotions without taking 
into account this background and these contributions.
As we have said throughout this chapter, expressing emotions means putting something 
in common with others. We have also seen how an emotional performance, such as love, 
changes through historical discourse. Regarding performance, love always depends on 
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the non-verbal gestures, and how the other responds. Something in these gestures, in its 
performance, does not get repeated in the same way. Such gestures cannot pass the word. 
Everything becomes real in the intersubjective emotional space. Thanks to the concept of 
performance, developed by Judith Butler, emotions are not something fixed, defined, and 
static. They are constantly evolving, continuously complying with an iteration process, 
and they do it through language, natural and subjective. This constant iteration makes 
emotions appear and disappear from the discursive arena, leaving some forgotten (accidie) 
and discovering new others (technoscience). We consider emotions as a constant evolution 
in daily discourse. This evolution has its highest expression in technoscience. In fact, 
the term emotion can be associated with very specific areas in technoscience, and thus 
emotional expressions come into play in the discursive arena. The emergence of concepts 
such as techno-disembodiment, or the emotional connection between individuals and new 
technologies, i.e., the concept of machine-affective of Nikolas Rose, are just some examples 
of what we introduce in the current scope of technoscience. Finally, the concept of disclosure 
is useful to help us think about love in the age of technoscience.
We can conclude by saying that we have outlined in this bibliographic review, the 
possibility of a contingent relationship between emotions and language, and considered 
it as a break or a continuation from social constructionism to post-constructionism, in 
which we find the concept of performance of Judith Butler, and the relationship between 
emotion, language, and their variations. The last aspect of performance is its approach to 
technoscience. We find impossible to speak of technoscience and performance without 
considering the whole process. For this reason, we wanted to make this journey, to reach 
these conclusions, as we will move forward with our future research on the topic of emotion 
and language in new technologies.
Bauman (2006) argues that emotions are variable and slippery. They lose momentum very 
quickly. They tend to be diverted from the original purpose to the slightest distraction. Love 
is like thirst, it always ends being quenched. Emotions are fickle and change completely. The 
crowds formed to lynch someone, sometimes may feel moved by a merciful feeling. There 
are many emotions and they speak with different, and often discordant, voices. This is why 
Max Weber in his most famous work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1903) 
mentioned them as a key reason for the good survival of society, because reason, unlike 
emotions, is one and has a unique voice. Since emotions are a continuous performance, 
every attempt to repeat them is doomed to fail. As we know, love is variable and changes 
continuously. It is never the same. We cannot find a single definition of love shared by 
everyone. Performance is continuous and constant. Each individual has a version of love, 
which changes continuously over time as well as the person who is in love changes too.
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